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Abstract 
Nonsymbolic comparison tasks are commonly used to index the acuity of an individual’s 
approximate number system (ANS), a cognitive mechanism believed to be involved in the 
development of number skills. Here we asked whether the time that an individual spends 
observing numerical stimuli influences the precision of the resultant ANS representations. 
Contrary to standard computational models of the ANS, we found that the longer the stimulus 
was displayed, the more precise was the resultant representation. We propose an adaptation 
of the standard model, and suggest that this finding has significant methodological 
implications for numerical cognition research. 
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SAMPLING FROM THE MENTAL NUMBER LINE: HOW ARE APPROXIMATE 
NUMBER SYSTEM REPRESENTATIONS FORMED? 
 
Fluency with mathematics is essential for day-to-day life. To successfully interact in a 
modern society it is frequently necessary to interpret, compare and calculate with numerical 
quantities. Along with a capacity to understand numerical ideas when represented 
symbolically, humans also have an Approximate Number System (ANS) which can be used 
to perform arithmetic operations on non-symbolic quantities such as arrays of dots or tones. 
The ANS is present in very young infants and some non-human animals (for a review see 
Dehaene, 1997), and recently some theorists have begun to speculate that it serves as the 
cognitive basis for symbolic mathematics (e.g. Halberda, Mazzocco, & Feigenson, 2008). 
The ANS is widely believed to follow Weber’s law: the standard model proposes that 
when we encounter non-symbolic stimuli, a box of n oranges say, the distribution of possible 
ANS representations follows a normal distribution with mean n and standard deviation wn. 
Here w is the Weber fraction, a parameter which represents the acuity of an individual’s ANS 
(e.g., Barth, La Mont, Lipton, Dehaene, Kanwisher & Spelke, 2008). Several recent studies 
have shown that individuals’ ANS acuities are correlated with achievement in symbolic 
mathematics (e.g. Gilmore, McCarthy & Spelke, 2010; Halberda et al., 2008; Libertus, 
Feigenson & Halberda, 2011; Mazzocco, Feigenson & Halberda, 2011a, 2011b; but see 
Inglis, Attridge, Batchelor & Gilmore, 2011; Price, Palmer, Battista & Ansari, 2012), lending 
credence to the suggestion that the ANS is implicated in the development of symbolic 
mathematics competence. 
Although the capabilities of the ANS are now fairly well understood, the process by 
which the ANS forms representations from visual numerical stimuli is less clear. Several 
researchers have proposed that a mental ‘accumulator’ is central to this process (e.g. Dehaene 
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& Changeux, 1993; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Piazza & Izard, 2009; Verguts & Fias, 2004). 
Gallistel and Gelman drew an analogy between filling up a beaker with cups of liquid, and 
filling up the accumulator with “accumulator units”. They suggested that when an array of 
objects is observed, the scene is first normalized to remove numerically-irrelevant between-
object differences (color, shape, size etc), then one cupful of ‘liquid’ is added to the 
accumulator per item. The contents of the accumulator are then emptied into memory which 
introduces noise proportionate to the accumulator’s contents (the “sloshing” of liquid in the 
memory beaker, in Gallistel and Gelman’s analogy). It is this noise, when the contents of the 
memory beaker are read off (converted into a numerical quantity), which causes the 
approximate nature of ANS representations. 
It is notable that both Barth et al.’s (2008) computational model of the ANS, and 
Gallistel and Gelman’s (2000) accumulator beaker analogy assume that the duration for 
which a numerical stimulus is displayed is irrelevant to the ANS representation that an 
individual encodes from it. To date this assumption has not been tested. We see two reasons 
for questioning it. First, earlier researchers have reported different Weber fractions in studies 
which have used different display times. For example, a dot comparison task with a stimuli 
duration of 200ms resulted in less precise ANS representations (mean w = 0.3, Halberda et 
al., 2008) than one with a display time of 750ms (mean w = 0.1, Halberda & Feigenson, 
2008). Second, it is well known that performance on many other visual tasks is dependent on 
stimuli durations (e.g., visual search: Guest & Lamberts, 2011; McElree & Carrasco, 1999; 
absolute identification: Guest, Kent & Adelman, 2010). 
Our goal in this paper is to explore whether the precision of an individual’s ANS 
representation varies with the length of time they spend studying the numerical stimulus. This 
question is important for at least two reasons. First because, as discussed above, it sheds light 
on the underlying mechanism that the ANS uses to form representations. Second, because 
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numerical cognition researchers have to date adopted widely varying methods when 
conducting experimental studies. When presenting numerical comparison tasks (where 
participants are shown two dot arrays and asked to determine which is more numerous), some 
researchers have permitted participants to decide how long to study the stimuli before 
reaching a judgement (e.g., Inglis et al., 2011; Pica et al., 2004), whereas others have 
displayed the stimuli for a fixed period. Among those who have used fixed stimuli durations, 
some have displayed stimuli for as little as 200ms (e.g., Halberda et al., 2008) whereas others 
have used up to 2500ms (e.g., Halberda & Feigenson, 2008), and some researchers have used 
different stimuli durations for different participants within the same experiment (e.g., 
Halberda & Feigenson, 2008; Mazzocco, Feigenson & Halberda, 2011b). All these authors 
have assumed that these methods investigate the same underlying process, but if the 
formation of ANS representations is time dependent then it is questionable whether results 
from these studies are comparable.  
Here we report two experiments which directly investigated whether the acuity of 
ANS representations encoded from visual stimuli varies with stimuli duration. In Experiment 
1 we demonstrate that individuals’ accuracies and Weber fractions are strongly dependent on 
stimuli duration, in Experiment 2 we show that this is not the result of differing onset-to-
decision latencies, and in the general discussion we propose an adaptation of the standard 
model of the ANS which accounts for these data. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 12 staff or students of Loughborough University with 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, who participated in exchange for a small 
inconvenience allowance. The study took place in a quiet laboratory using a 15” laptop. 
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Procedure. Each of 400 trials began with a fixation cross which was displayed for 
1000ms. This was followed by two dot arrays (a red array on the left of the screen and a blue 
array on the right) which were displayed for either 16ms (the refresh rate of the monitor),  
300ms, 600ms, 1200ms or 2400ms. After the alloted time period the dot arrays were replaced 
by two red and blue masks and a question mark. Participants were then required to select 
which of the arrays was the more numerous by pressing either a blue or red key on a response 
box. No feedback was given to participants. Trials were blocked by display time, and each 
participant was given the blocks in a random order. Each block consisted of 80 trials (which 
were identical between blocks) and was preceeded by a practice block of 10 trials. The 
problems used numerosities in the range 5 to 21, with comparison ratios of approximately 
0.5, 0.6, 0.7 and 0.8. Each problem appeared twice, once where the larger numerosity was on 
the left hand side of the screen, and once when it was on the right. Stimuli were created using 
Gebuis and Reynvoet’s (2011) method. The paradigm is summarised in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. An illustration of the procedure used in Experiment 1. 
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Modelling. As well as calculating each individual’s accuracy, we fitted participants’ 
data to the standard computational model of the ANS (Barth et al., 2008) using the log 
likelihood method. According to the standard model, accuracy on a given trial is a function of 
the numerosities involved and the individual’s Weber fraction: 
acc(n1,n2;w) =
1
2 +
1
2 erf
n1 − n2
2w n12 + n22
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
'     
 
Where n1 and n2 are the to-be-compared numerosities, w is the Weber fraction and erf is the 
error function.
 
Results. 
Participants’ accuracies varied from .77 to .92 (M = .85, SD = 0.05), and their overall 
Weber fractions varied between 0.18 and 0.39 (M = 0.27, SD = 0.06). We first calculated 
participants’ Weber fractions separately for each of the five display durations. The mean ws 
were 0.57, 0.29, 0.25, 0.19 and 0.17 for the 16ms, 300ms, 600ms, 1200ms and 2400ms 
conditions respectively, F(1.081, 0.065) = 16.636, p = .001, ηp2 = .602 (Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction), which represented a significant linear trend, F(1, 10) = 23.348, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.680.  
Mean accuracies for each of the comparison ratios are shown in Figure 2, and were 
analysed using a 4 (comparison ratio: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8) × 5 (stimuli duration: 16ms, 300ms, 
600ms, 1200ms, 2400ms) within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA). As is characteristic 
of ANS tasks, the main effect of ratio was significant, F(3, 33) = 143.076, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.929, and also showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 11) = 408.307, p < .001, ηp2 = .974. 
Critically, there was also a significant effect of stimuli duration, F(4, 44) = 28.638, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .722, which also showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 11) = 49.075, p < .001, ηp2 = 
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.817. The longer the stimuli duration, the more accurate participants were. The interaction 
effect did not approach significance, F(12, 132) = 1.550, p = .114. 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ mean accuracies in each of the five stimuli duration conditions in 
Experiment 1, by comparison ratio. Error bars show ±1 SE of the mean. 
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Next we used one-sample t-tests to assess each mean accuracy figure to determine 
whether participants were performing at above chance levels. Every mean was well above 
50%, all ps < .001, suggesting that participants were able to perform comparisons of 
numerosities with ratios 4:5 in only 16ms. To check whether participants’ relatively high 
accuracies in the 16ms condition was the result of cross-block learning, we considered the 
performance of the three participants who received the 16ms block first. Each performed at 
above chance levels (74%, 66% and 63%, all ps < .02) and were well within the range of 
other participants (59% to 88%), suggesting that the ANS is capable of processing 
numerosities under extreme time pressure. No participant reported failing to see the stimuli in 
the 16ms condition, perhaps because we did not use a forward mask; it therefore remains to 
be seen whether the ANS can process numerical concepts subliminally. 
Discussion 
Two notable findings emerged from Experiment 1. First, participants were able to 
successfully encode ANS representations from stimuli displayed for as little as 16ms, 
suggesting that the process of forming ANS representations is automatic, or at least 
extremely rapid. Second, although participants were reliably able to complete the comparison 
task in 16ms, they were significantly more accurate with longer display times.  
These findings indicate that forming ANS representations and using them to generate 
behavior is a time-dependent process. An obvious question concerns where in Gallistel and 
Gelman’s (2000) analogy a time dependency could occur. We see three possibilities, which 
we discuss in turn. First, it could be that the input to the ANS becomes more precise with 
more time. In other words, that when participants view arrays of dots the precision of their 
initial visual processing increases with time. Below we suggest that there are theoretical and 
empirical reasons for doubting this account. A second possibility is that the output of the 
ANS is processed differently under different time constraints. Perhaps representations from 
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the ANS are generated extremely rapidly upon stimuli onset, but the process used to compare 
the two representations – the last stage in Gallistel and Gelman’s analogy – is time 
dependent. We rule out this possibility in Experiment 2. Finally, it could be that the precision 
of participants’ ANS representations themselves increase with time. We discuss a possible 
mechanism for this latter account in the general discussion at the end of the paper. 
The first account suggests that participants’ initial visual processing is more precise in 
the slower conditions, and that therefore the input to the ANS is more precise as well. We see 
three reasons to doubt this account. First, the initial stages of Gallistel and Gelman’s (2000) 
account can be seen as equivalent to the initial preattentive stage of accounts of visual search 
behavior (e.g. Triesman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). Since the two dot arrays on typical 
comparison tasks differ on only one salient feature (typically color), the initial visual 
processing on each trial is directly analogous to that on single feature visual search tasks (i.e. 
where participants are asked to, for example, find a blue A among red As). According to the 
Guided Search account (Wolfe, 1994), when faced with blue- and red-colored stimuli of the 
type presented in our dot comparison tasks, a color ‘feature map’ is preattentively and 
automatically constructed. This map contains tagged activation levels corresponding to each 
blue or red item in the visual scene. It is only when different feature maps need to be 
integrated that slow serial visual processing is recruited (e.g. where an individual is searching 
for a blue A among red As and blue Hs then information from both the color and the shape 
feature maps needs to be integrated). We suggest that it is the number of blue and red 
activation locations in this preattentive feature map which provides an input to the ANS. If 
this account is correct, then the initial visual processing would not be time dependent as the 
feature map is constructed automatically in parallel. 
Second, if the initial visual processing of the dots were a time-dependent serial 
process, we would expect the number of dots in each trial to be predictive of the trial’s 
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difficulty and, moreover, that the number of dots would interact with the stimuli duration (on 
short trials we would expect that the difficulty difference between problems with large 
numbers of dots and those with small numbers of dots would be lower than on long trials). To 
investigate this we categorized each trial as being either ‘large’ or ‘small’ (based on a median 
split of the total number of dots on each trial), and analyzed participants’ accuracy data using 
a 5 (duration) × 2 (size) within-subjects ANOVA. We found neither an interaction effect, 
F(4,44) = 1.015, p = .410, nor a main effect of size, F(1,44) = 3.680, p = .081. Both these 
findings are consistent with the suggestion that the initial visual stage of processing in dot 
comparison tasks takes place in parallel. 
Finally, if the initial stage of processing were, in part at least, driving individuals’ 
ANS acuities, then we would expect individual differences in visual processing speeds to be 
related to ANS acuities. But Simms, Clayton, Cragg, Gilmore, Marlow, & Johnson (2013) 
found no relationship between performance on Anderson, Reid and Nelson’s (2001) measure 
of visual processing speed, and a typical ANS dot comparison task, r = .001, p = .991. 
The second and third accounts of where the time dependency could occur in Gallistel 
and Gelman’s (2000) analogy are both consistent with the data reported in Experiment 1. In 
particular, in Experiment 1 stimuli duration was confounded with the latency between stimuli 
onset and participants’ decision points. In other words, it might be possible that participants’ 
increased accuracy in conditions with longer display times was not due to more precise ANS 
representations (as proposed by the third account), but rather to having longer to perform the 
arithmetical comparison operation upon representations which were automatically generated 
at the stimuli onset (as proposed by the second account). This is especially plausible given 
Guest et al.’s (2010) finding that in absolute identification tasks it is the onset-to-decision 
latency that influences accuracy, not stimuli display time. We conducted a second experiment 
to disentangle these factors. 
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Experiment 2 
The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the effect found in 
Experiment 1 was due to stimuli duration, or the onset-to-decision latency. Here we held 
stimuli duration constant and varied the onset-to-decision latencies. 
Method 
Participants were 11 staff or students of Loughborough University. The procedure and 
stimuli were identical to Experiment 1 except that the two dot arrays were displayed for 48ms 
on each trial. After the 48ms had elapsed the red-blue masks were displayed and then, after 
either 0ms, 252ms, 552ms, 1152ms or 2352ms, a question mark appeared to signal that 
participants should select which array was the more numerous. This paradigm is summarized 
in Figure 3. If the main factor driving the findings in Experiment 1 were the onset-to-decision 
latency, we would expect a similar set of data in Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 3. An illustration of the procedure used in Experiment 2. 
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Results and Discussion 
Participants’ w parameters were calculated for each of the five delay times. The mean 
ws from the five conditions (0.49, 0.54, 0.42, 0.44 and 0.39) were not significantly different, 
F(2.154, 21.537) = 2.623, p =.092 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction). The accuracy data are 
shown in Figure 4. These data were analyzed using a 4 (comparison ratio: 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8) × 
5 (onset-to-decision latency: 48ms, 300ms, 600ms, 1200ms, 2400ms) within-subjects 
analysis of variance (ANOVA). As before, the main effect of ratio was significant, F(3, 30) = 
38.724, p < .001, ηp2 = .795, and also showed a significant linear trend, F(1, 10) = 70.239, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .875. However, critically, the main effect of onset-to-decision latency did not 
approach significance, F(4, 40) = 1.478, p = .227, suggesting that there were no systematic 
accuracy differences between the five different conditions. Consequently we can rule out the 
possibility that the accuracy differences between display times observed in Experiment 1 
were due to differences in the onset-to-decision latencies of the different conditions. 
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Figure 4. Participants’ mean accuracies in each of the five onset-to-decision conditions in 
Experiment 2, by comparison ratio. Error bars show ±1 SE of the mean. 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
Summary of Main Findings 
Our primary goal was to investigate how the duration of numerical stimuli influences 
the acuity of resultant ANS representations. Noting that earlier researchers have used 
dramatically different display times to estimate the acuity of individuals’ ANSs, in 
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Experiment 1 we systematically varied stimuli display times on a dot comparison task. We 
found that participants were able to perform at above chance levels when stimuli were 
displayed for only 16ms, but that, contrary to the assumption of the standard model, when 
stimuli were displayed for longer participants responded more accurately. In Experiment 2 
we rejected the suggestion that this effect could be due to different onset-to-decision latencies 
rather than stimuli display times. It therefore seems plausible to suppose that, instead of the 
higher accuracies in longer conditions found in Experiment 1 being the result of more 
successful manipulation of similarly precise ANS representations, it was the precision of the 
ANS representations themselves which varied between conditions. 
 
Taking multiple samples from visual numerical stimuli 
In this section of the paper we propose a modification of the standard computational 
model of the ANS which takes account of our results. Recall that an individual’s ANS 
representation for a numerosity n is traditionally said to follow a normal distribution with 
mean n and standard deviation wn, in other words N ~ N n, wn( )2( ) . We propose that when 
an individual observes a numerical stimuli, rather than taking a single sample from this 
distribution, they actually take many (the number determined by a function of the display 
time) and use the mean as the resultant ANS representation. In other words, we suggest that 
participants go through the first stages of Gallistel and Gelman’s (2000) analogy multiple 
times (perceptual encoding, normalizing the visual scene, filling up the accumulator with 
liquid, transferring the liquid to the ‘memory beaker’ and taking a reading), before using the 
average of their multiple samples – or ‘beaker readings’ – as the final ANS representation. 
Assuming that the individual takes f(t) samples, then the resultant ANS representation will 
follow the distribution of sample means from N: N ~ N n, wn( )
2
f (t)
!
"
#
#
$
%
&
& . 
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A natural question concerns the identity of the function f(t). Information accumulation 
models typically assume that stimuli onset is accompanied by rapid information 
accumulation, the rate of which gradually decreases towards some asymptotic limit (e.g. 
McElree & Carrasco, 1999). In contrast, in the case of taking samples from the N distribution, 
there appears to be no a priori reason to suppose that there would be a theoretical maximum 
number of samples that an individual could take. Consequently we suggest that a reasonable 
candidate function is f (t) =α tk , where α and k are parameters which determine the rate of 
information accumulation and which vary between individuals. Notice that the standard 
model of the ANS, which assumes a single sample is taken, is a restriction of this proposal, as 
f(t) = 1 when α = 1 and k = ∞. 
Given this proposal we would expect participants’ accuracies on a given trial to be a 
function of the to-be-compared numerosities n1 and n2, the display duration t, their Weber 
fraction w, α and k: 
acc(n1,n2, t;w,α,k) =
1
2 +
1
2 erf
t2k α n1 − n2
2w n12 + n22
"
#
$
$
%
&
'
'
 
We fitted each participants’ data from Experiment 1 to this model, treating w
α
 as a single 
parameter. Values of w
α
 ranged from 0.26 to 3.90 (M = 1.23, SD = 1.08), and values of k 
ranged from 0.66 to 8.07 (M = 1.88, SD = 2.04), indicating that there were substantial 
individual differences in the rate at which samples were taken. Overall the time-dependent 
model proved to have a significantly better fit to the data than the standard model, likelihood 
ratio test, χ2(1) = 238.3, p < .001.  
Given the large individual differences in the k parameter, we investigated the 
relationship between individuals’ acuity parameters from the two models (w from the 
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standard model and w
α
 from the time-based model). Although these parameters were 
correlated, r = .71, p = .009, this relationship was far from exact, as shown in Figure 5. This 
observation is important, because if our analysis is correct then what earlier researchers have 
reported as w parameters have actually been figures for w
α t2k
, suggesting that comparing 
Weber fractions between studies which have used different display times is flawed. We 
expand upon this remark in the remaining section of the paper. 
 
Figure 5. Participants’ w parameters (derived from the standard model) plotted against their 
w
α
 parameters (derived from the time-based model). 
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Methodological implications 
Our finding that stimuli durations influence the acuity of ANS representations has 
important methodological implications for numerical cognition researchers. We conclude the 
paper by highlighting two.  
First, we believe that the comparison of Weber fractions between tasks which have 
used different methods is problematic. For example, Gilmore, Attridge & Inglis (2011) gave 
participants a nonsymbolic comparison task and a nonsymbolic addition task (where 
participants were asked to determine the larger of n1+n2 and n3), and surprisingly found that 
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the ws derived from each did not correlate. They argued that this called into question the 
suggestion that a single system, the ANS, was used to complete these tasks. Our findings here 
suggest an alternative account. As is common, Gilmore et al. presented their comparison task 
concurrently (i.e. both n1 and n2 were onscreen at the same time), and allowed participants to 
respond at their own pace; but on their addition task, they presented n1, n2 and n3 
consecutively, each for 500ms. It may be that this discrepancy in stimuli duration was the 
cause of the lack of correlations between performance observed on the two tasks. 
Second, researchers who have investigated how the ANS develops through childhood 
have typically used different display times with different aged children. For example, 
Halberda and Feigenson (2008) used displays of 2500ms for 3-year-olds, 1200ms for 4-, 5- 
and 6- year olds, and 750ms for adults, and Mazzocco et al. (2011b) used display times of 
1200ms and 2500ms for the two age groups in their study, combining the data into a single 
analysis. Our findings indicate that this analysis strategy may be flawed, and that Weber 
fractions derived from tasks with different display times are not comparable. In future, 
researchers interested in individual differences in ANS acuities should pay attention to how 
their stimuli are displayed. 
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